Last week I participated in a Panel Event on Free Speech on Campus at the University of Sydney with Wojciech Sadurski and Adrienne Stone. It was a wonderful session with excellent questions from the audience. My presentation was called “Two Models of Speech on Camus”. Here’s the text, in dot-point form, of my presentation. I hope two write on a paper on these themes soon.

Introduction

I think that if you want to arrive at a proper view of the scope and limits of non-academic speech on campus, you need a proper understanding of the liberal purposes that universities serve, and the deep justification for having intuitions that serve these purposes
Everyone should agree that universities, in fact, serve these three distinct but overlapping liberal-democratic purposes:
- They advance knowledge of the kind that itself serves liberal purposes
- They prepare individuals for participation in the economy and for civic life
- They serve as effective sites for the exercise of the right to free speech
But it will not surprise anyone to hear that there are tensions that arise in having a single institution that attempts to serve all three of these purposes at once
- To serve the first purpose, universities and the academics working within them, need to be protected from undue influence of various kinds, and academic norms need to be upheld
- In serving the second purpose, universities are constrained by the requirements of social justice, just as any other basic institution of society is
- To serve the third purpose, universities must refrain from stringently regulating speech on campus
Each of these things is potentially in tension with the others
Developing an adequate response to or resolution of these tensions would be a big task (it would require an adequate understanding of the deep justification for having institutions that serve these purposes)
Here I will limit myself to saying a few things about the tension between free speech on campus and certain others aims of universities
- I want to compare two models of speech on campus, what I will call the standard model, and what I will call the academic model
- I want to suggest that the key to resolving some of the issues we are currently facing when it comes to speech on campus lies in developing a proper understanding of the deeper justification for independent academic inquiry and academic freedom

Academic speech and non-academic speech

Let me start with a distinction!
A helpful distinction in this context is that between academic speech and non-academic speech
This distinction is to be drawn in terms of the purpose of such speech
- Academic speech is speech with an academic purpose (broadly, the purpose of advancing knowledge)
- That purpose may be:
  - The dissemination of knowledge
  - To contribute to academic inquiry itself
    - Research seminars
    - Classroom discussion
- Non-academic speech is speech with a non-academic purpose
- Such purposes are various but the purpose is often that of protest
  - Protest against some broader injustice
  - Protest against the university itself
There are further distinctions between academic speech and non-academic speech
- Academic speech, as speech that is engaged in for the purpose of advancing knowledge, is governed by academic norms
  - General academic norms
  - Discipline specific academic norms
- Academics have a responsibility for ensuring
  - That academic norms are complied with
  - That discipline specific norms are fit for purpose
- Academics have (non-absolute) epistemic authority in judging
  - Whether academic norms are complied with or violated
  - Whether academic norms are fit for purpose
- Academics have (non-absolute) practical authority in
  - Ensuring that academic norms are complied with
  - e.g. in the classroom
- The norms themselves may determine a hierarchy of academic authority, authority based on distinctions in disciplinary expertise
- Non-academic speech, by contrast, is typically governed by far more permissive norms
  - Often just whatever the prevailing free speech norms are
  - In other words, any speech that is not prohibited by law

Some differences between academic and non-academic speech

These distinctions have important consequences
- Academic speech tends to lack some of the more problematic implications that non-academic speech has
  - There is little reason for academic speech to occupy a kind of “moral grey area”, where it is not quite prohibited by law, but borders on speech that is prohibited by law
  - There is no reason for academic speech to be unnecessarily offensive, shocking, or provocative; there is no reason for academic speech to be overly heated and personal
  - This is not to say that it never has these features, or that these are not sometimes called for
  - But there are strong norms against academic speech of this kind, as it is generally antithetical to the aims of academic inquiry
- Non-academic speech, in contrast, often occupies this “moral grey area”, and the norms tend in the opposite direction: there are strong norms against interfering in non-academic speech (except where such speech is prohibited by law)
These distinctions correspond to distinctions in broader consequences
- While it is not impossible for the norms of academic speech to be in tension with the aim of ensuring that universities do not unjustly or unfairly exclude, disadvantage, or contribute to further marginalising certain social groups, the tension between non-academic speech and this aim is far more significant

Two Tensions and Two Models

This brings us to the two tensions I want to focus on
- The first is the tension just mentioned
  - This is the tension between both academic and non-academic speech on campus and the aim of ensuring that the institutions that constitute the basic structure of society are just
- The second relates to the tension between non-academic speech and the aims of academic inquiry itself, or the aim of advancing knowledge for liberal purposes

The Standard Model

Consider how these tensions arise on what I will call the “standard model”
According to the standard model we can divide the university into two zones:
- An academic zone
  - Here speech must confirm to academic norms
- A free speech zone
  - The norms are far more permissive
Many have observed that this model gives rise to a serious tension between non-academic speech and the aim of ensuring that universities do not unjustly or unfairly exclude, disadvantage, or contribute to further marginalising certain social groups.
Many have also observed that this model gives rise to a serious tension between non-academic speech and the aims of academic inquiry itself
- There is a worry about “norm creep”
  - Academic norms may be undermined if there is a confusion about which norms apply in a certain context
- There is a worry about some exercising their “right” to free speech in a way that amounts to their exerting undue influence on academic inquiry
- There is a worry about undermining trust in academic authority
  - Permitting speech that does not conform to academic standards risks the perception that universities and academics are not governed by standards worthy of protection
Many have also suggested an alternative to the standard model
- For lack of a better name, we might call it the academic model

The Academic Model

The academic model attempts to resolve the tension between advancing knowledge and non-academic speech on campus by holding that academic norms should prevail more broadly on campus
It holds that this is necessary to avoid the problems just noted relating to “norm creep”, undue influence, and the undermining of trust
- Nobody is suggesting that academic norms be enforced
  - And let me be clear: I certainly do not think that the norms should be enforced “from above”
- What would be needed is a “culture change”, a shift from thinking about universities on the standard model, to thinking about universities on the academic model
On the academic model, in addition to promoting such a “culture change”, and as a means to bringing such a change about, academics may be granted more authority over the question of external invited speakers
- They may be granted strictly limited authority to prevent an external invited speaker from speaking on grounds that their speaking would not confirm to minimal academic standards
Any sensible version of the academic model should acknowledge the need to otherwise be maximally tolerant of non-academic speech on campus
It is worth noting that the academic model also has implications for the tension between academic speech and the aim of ensuring that universities do not unjustly or unfairly exclude, disadvantage, certain social groups
The academic model will acknowledge the need for academics to take responsibility for ensuring that the norms of academic speech are not in tension with this aim
But it will also acknowledge the serious risk of some seeking to influence academic inquiry in the name of social justice
One nice thing about the academic model is that it may solve all of our problems at once
Although it is motivated by the tension between the aim of advancing knowledge and non-academic speech on campus…
…it would go a long way towards addressing the tension between non-academic speech on campus and the aim of ensuring that universities do not unjustly or unfairly exclude, disadvantage certain social groups
We might optimistically hope that this tension will take care of itself if the tension between advancing knowledge and non-academic speech on campus were resolved
One further nice thing about the academic model also is that it allows us to avoid what I take to be a bad response to the tension between non-academic speech on campus and social justice: directly regulating non-academic speech, by various means of enforcement, from above, in the name of social justice

Justifying the Academic Model

Things are about to get a bit more philosophical, so bear with me

Why the standard justifications fail

The trouble with the academic model, however, as I see it, is that in order to defend it against the arguments of the Free Speech Radical and the Social Justice Warrior, one would need a proper understanding of the reasons why we should have institutions whose aim it is to advance knowledge of the kind that serves liberal purposes, why the promotion and protection of academic and disciplinary norms are essential to that task, and why academic inquiry should jealously protected from interference
It is not enough to assert that academic norms should have priority on campus, as the Academic Purist does
- We need an argument
It will not do to assert that it is the stated mission of the university is that of advancing knowledge
- So what? Says the Free Speech Radical and the Social Justice Warrior. So much the worse for the stated mission. And in any case, this mission does not preclude others.
The standard epistemological arguments are also inadequate
- Appeals to the intrinsic value of knowledge and truth aren’t going to cut it
- Appeals to ways that the knowledge advanced by universities contributes to the public good are also not going to cut it
- Why should advancing knowledge, or seeking the truth, matter more than social justice?
- Why should advancing knowledge, or seeking the truth, take priority over protesting injustice?
The standard democratic arguments in terms of “making better citizens” and “making better decisions” do better but are also inadequate
- What does the aim of producing active and engaged citizens, even have to do with the aim of advancing knowledge, and academic freedom?
None of these arguments get to the heart of what is at stake when it comes to the importance to liberal societies of supporting institutions whose aim it is to advance knowledge of the kind that serves liberal purposes

Democratic legitimacy and democratic competence

What is the fundamental value served by academic inquiry? What is the deeper justification for academic freedom?
Robert Post has argued that the fundamental value in the vicinity here is democratic legitimacy
Post understands the ideal of democratic legitimacy in terms of the idea of self-government: “those who are subject to law should also experience themselves as authors of law” (Post 2012 18)
Post notes the protection of free speech in general is necessary for democratic legitimacy:
He writes:

If persons are prevented from participating in the formation of public opinion so as to render public opinion responsive to their own point of view, they are not likely to regard themselves as potentially the authors of government decisions that affect them. (Post 2012 17)

Post takes the protection of free speech to be necessary for democratic legitimacy, for realising the ideal of self-government; but he does not think that it is sufficient
But Post argues that something else is necessary, namely democratic competence

Democratic competence refers to the cognitive empowerment of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge. Cognitive empowerment is necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of democratic legitimation. (Post 2012 34)

This sounds plausible, but the connection between cognitive empowerment and democratic legitimation is not immediately obvious
It is clear that Post is not so much concerned with the cognitive empowerment of democratic citizens (which would support intelligent self-governance) but rather with the absence of the influence of other forms of power from the process of cognitive empowerment
He writes:

A state that controls our knowledge controls our minds. Because “contemporary Western societies are in one sense or another ruled by knowledge and expertise,” a state that can manipulate the production of disciplinary knowledge can set the terms of its own legitimacy. It can undermine the capacity of citizens to form autonomous and critical opinions. It can make a mockery of the obligation of democratic government to be responsive to the views of its citizens. (Post:2012 33)

I think that Post is right that such control would undermine democratic legitimacy
But I think it is not the ideal of self-government that is at issue here

Democratic Legitimacy and Freedom as Non-Subordination

Rather, it is the democratic ideal of non-subordination or non-inferiority the ideal of not being ruled over by others, particularly superiors (Kolodny 2014)
When some are able to exercise greater influence on public opinion than others by exerting undue influence over academic inquiry, they subordinate those others to their own will
When governments do this, those in government subordinate those they rule to their own will, they set themselves up as superior to those they rule over
The advantage of this explanation over Post’s is that it allows us to explain why when any group in society exerts undue influence over academic inquiry, they subordinate others to their will, they set themselves up as superiors to those others
Post’s explanation only works for government interference (as far as I can tell)
I say that it is the subordination of some by others by this means that undermines democratic legitimacy
How does does independent academic inquiry serve the democratic ideal of non-subordination, or not living under the power of a superior?
- Well, it may provide knowledge or understanding of the operation of society that ensures that others able to identify subordination
- This is a version of the familiar “protective” argument: such knowledge protects against the abuse of power
  - But it only goes so far, since so much knowledge advanced by universities is not “about” power
- But it also provides a source of opinion (hopefully knowledge) that, at the very least, does not reflect the influence of those who would exercise power over others by influencing the direction of academic inquiry
  - Such opinion will still reflect human biases and human interests, but the aim, at least, is to ensure that academic norms do what they can to minimise such bias—this is a regulative aim of academic inquiry

Benefits of the deeper justification

I hope it is clear how such a deeper justification could bear on my earlier points
This is not an ideal to give up on lightly
We are rightly cautious about having academic inquiry influenced in some extra-academic way by some in the name of social justice, lest this amount to nothing more than some exercising power over others by exercising influence over the direction of inquiry
We are rightly cautious about having inquiry be influenced or interfered with in the name of free speech, lest this amount to nothing more than some exercising power over others by exercising influence over the direction of inquiry
We are rightly cautious about the university’s reputation when it comes to upholding the norms of academic inquiry, lest broader society comes to doubt that the university is able provide a source of knowledge that does not merely reflect the interests of certain sectors of society

Conclusion

So to sum up, if you are attracted to the academic model as a solution to some of the ills of campus life, there is a lot to be said for looking for and articulating a deeper justification of academic inquiry and academic freedom
I think that the academic model has its attractions, and that a justification along these lines can be developed
I want to end with a note of caution, however
I think that the academic model would need to be defended and implemented in a way that recognises and accommodates the concerns of those concerned with social justice, and with the protection of free speech
It would be unwise dialectically to dismiss these claims out-of-hand, to assert that they have no place, as the Academic Purist does
Better to articulate what is at stake when these concerns come into conflict with the aims of academic inquiry

JSI Seminar Panel Event on Free Speech on Campus